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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to describe the behavior of Brazilian sovereign risk from 1995 to 2005 and 
evaluate the influence of international financial crises on the Brazilian sovereign risk in this period. The 
influence of international financial crises on the sovereign risk is analysed by econometric methods. The 
sovereign risk can econometrically be modelled ad hoc by regressing on explaining variables like the 
IBOVESPA, the short-term interest rate SELIC, the Brazilian international reserves, the exchange rate to the 
US$ and the foreign portfolio investment flows in equity and fixed income. The first four variables are used 
to construct an exchange market pressure index to identify and measure periods of international financial 
crises and model their influence on the sovereign risk. Another model explains changes in the sovereign risk 
by the exchange market pressure index and the foreign portfolio investment flows equity and does fairly well 
in a dynamic forecast for the dependent variable Brazilian sovereign risk. Monthly data were used with the 
Granger causality test to identify lead/lag relations. The results show that the market variables are 
determined simultaneously, while the SELIC rate reacts with a certain short lag, showing that monetary 
policy reacts to the financial crises more than anticipates them. The Granger causality test was used also for 
daily data with the same result. 
Key words: Sovereign Risk, International Capital Flows, Portfolio Investment. 
RISCO SOBERANO BRASILEIRO, CRISES INTERNACIONAIS E FLUXOS DE 
INVESTIMENTOS ESTRANGEIROS EM CARTEIRAS DE AÇÕES 
RESUMO 
O objetivo deste artigo é descrever o comportamento do risco soberano brasileiro de 1995 a 2005, para 
avaliar a influência das crises financeiras internacionais sobre o risco soberano brasileiro nesse período. A 
influência das crises financeiras internacionais é analisada por métodos econométricos. O risco soberano 
pode ser modelado econometricamente mediante regressões com variáveis explicativas, tais como 
IBOVESPA, taxa de juros SELIC de curto prazo, reservas internacionais brasileiras, taxa de câmbio do Real 
em relação ao dólar americano e fluxos de investimentos estrangeiros para portfólios de ações e renda fixa. 
As primeiras quatro variáveis são usadas para a construção de um índice de pressão do mercado de câmbio 
que identifique e mensure períodos de crise financeira internacional e modele suas influências sobre o risco 
soberano. Outro modelo explica as mudanças no risco soberano em razão do índice de pressão do mercado 
de câmbio e dos fluxos de investimentos estrangeiros em portfólios de ações, obtendo bons resultados em 
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uma projeção dinâmica sobre a variável dependente risco soberano brasileiro. Dados mensais foram usados 
em um teste de causalidade de Granger para identificar relações defasadas. Os resultados mostraram que as 
variáveis de mercado são determinadas simultaneamente, enquanto a taxa de juros SELIC reage com certa 
defasagem curta, o que revela que políticas monetárias reagem mais às crises financeiras do que se 
antecipam a elas. O teste de causalidade de Granger foi usado para dados diários e obteve o mesmo 
resultado. 
Palavras-chave: Risco, Fluxos Internacionais de Capitais, Carteira de Investimento. 
EL RIESGO SOBERANO DE BRASIL, CRISIS INTERNACIONALES Y FLUJOS DE INVERSIÓN 
EXTRANJERA EN CARTERA 
RESUMEN 
El objetivo de este artículo es describir el comportamiento del riesgo soberano brasileño de 1995 a 2005 
para evaluar la influencia de las crisis financieras internacionales sobre el riesgo soberano brasileño en 
este periodo. La influencia de las crisis financieras internacionales es analizada por métodos econométricos. 
El riesgo soberano puede ser modelado econometricamente a través de regresiones con variables 
explicativas, tales como, IBOVESPA, tasa de interés SELIC de corto plazo, reservas internacionales 
brasileñas, tasa de cambio del Real en relación al dólar americano y los flujos de inversiones extranjeras 
para carteras de acciones y renta fija. Las primeras cuatro variables son usadas para construir un índice de 
presión del mercado de cambio para identificar y mensurar períodos de crisis financiera internacional y 
modelar sus influencias sobre el riesgo soberano. Otro modelo explica las mudanzas en el riesgo soberano 
debido al índice de presión del mercado de cambio y a los flujos de inversiones extranjeras en carteras de 
acciones y obtuvo buenos resultados en una proyección dinámica sobre la variable dependiente riesgo 
soberano brasileño. Datos mensuales fueron usados en un test de casualidad de Granger para identificar 
relaciones rezagadas. Los resultados mostraron que las variables de mercado son determinadas 
simultáneamente, mientras la tasa de interés SELIC reacciona con algún retraso corto, mostrando que 
políticas monetarias reaccionan más a las crisis financieras  que se antecipan a ellas. El test de casualidad 
de Granger ha sido usado para datos diarios y obtuvo el mismo resultado. 
 
Palabras-clave: Riesgo, Flujos Internacionales de Capitales, Cartera de Inversiones. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign risk, focusing on the probability of a 
government defaulting on debt, plays an important 
role in literature and in the assessment and 
administration of risk in international transactions, 
as can be seen in Frenkel, Karman and Scholtens 
(2004).  
Sovereign risk is a specific concept of the 
broader term, country risk, measuring the economic 
and political stability of a country. In international 
transactions the assessment and administration of 
country risk is important for the strategies of 
international investment and the hedging of 
international positions by financial and non-
financial corporations.  
The use of econometric methods, which are 
backward looking but open the possibility to 
establish lead/lag relations for the variables, is also 
opening an horizon to create possible forward 
looking risk indicators, that are important for the 
assessment and administration of international risk 
by financial and non-financial corporations.  
The objective of this paper is to describe the 
behavior of Brazilian sovereign risk from 1995 to 
2005, evaluate the influence of international 
financial crises on the Brazilian sovereign risk in 
this period (Mexico 1994/95, Southeast Asia 1997, 
Russia 1998, Brazil 1998/99, Argentina 2001/2 and 
Brazil 2002/3), and estimate lead/lag relationships 
between the Brazilian sovereign risk, other 
financial and macroeconomic indicators and the 
foreign portfolio investment flows entering and 
leaving Brazil in the period.  
2. BRAZILIAN SOVEREIGN RISK 
Since the end of the eighties, the demand for 
information related to risk analysis has increased in 
the international financial market. Because of this 
demand for more precise information on risk 
assessment, some mechanisms for measuring, 
monitoring and risk assessment have been widely 
publicized. Several methodologies have been 
developed to serve this purpose along with the 
construction of indicators of the market related to 
certain types of risk. 
Garcia and Didier (2001) define sovereign risk 
as a reflection of the economic and financial 
situation of a country, reflecting also the political 
stability and performance, historically, of fulfilling 
financial obligations. 
About the relevance of sovereign credit risk, 
Cantor and Packer (1996) believe it is important 
not only that some of the largest issuers of 
securities in the international market are national 
governments, but also that these concepts of risk 
affect the credit risk of lending to borrowers of the 
same nationality. 
Country risk can be measured in various ways. 
According to Scholtens (2004), country risk “is the 
risk that unforeseen events in a foreign country 
affect the value of international assets, investment 
projects and their cash flows. Traditionally, the 
theoretical analysis of country risk distinguished 
between the ability to pay and the willingness to 
pay.  
The first assumes that if a debtor is able to meet 
his obligations, he will do so. The debtor will 
default only if he cannot fulfill his repayment 
obligations (interest, amortizations). Various 
macroeconomic solvency and liquidity indicators 
are used to measure the capacity to pay. However, 
willingness to pay also appears to play a role.”  
More specifically, sovereign risk focuses on the 
possibility of a default of a government on its debt. 
There are different forms of evaluating country risk 
and sovereign risk. Scholtens (2004) shows four 
approaches to assess country and sovereign risk: 
“the balanced-score card approach (BSC), the 
country risk rating, the secondary market analysis, 
and the option approach. Of course, in practice, all 
four approaches may be employed in some 
combination or another.” 
The characteristics of the terms and conditions of 
financial transactions carried out by foreign 
investors, through isions on the allocation of 
financial resources, have been isive in determining 
the magnitude and composition of capital flows to 
developing countries in the ade of nineties.  
On the relevance of indicators of sovereign risk 
in this process, Adams, Mathieson and Schinasi 
(1999) show the great responsibility and impact 
that they have on both the cost of borrowing as well 
as on the desire expressed by institutional investors 
to keep certain assets in its possession. 
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Commenting on the characteristics associated 
with the debt-conversion of external debts of 
developing countries, Fabozzi (2000) states that the 
secondary market of these securities is highly liquid 
in the world, presenting large volumes of daily 
trading. According to Bhatt (1988), the financial 
innovations related to the process of securitization 
also create conditions for the emergence of 
secondary markets for a large number of financial 
instruments, such as bills, bonds and shares.  
The securitization also contributed to the 
reintegration process of developing countries into 
international financial market, because of the 
boundary limits of operations and simplified 
procedures for attracting external resources. 
Barros and Mendes (1994) suggest several factors 
related to the expansion of credits securitization, 
which are:  
• Generalization of the culture of aversion to risk;  
• Progress of information and communication 
technologies;  
• Dissemination of international financial 
innovation;  
• Growth of operations "out of balance";  
• Increasing participation of so-called institutional 
investors.  
Pinheiro (2005) considers that securitization is a 
transaction that allows a renegotiation of debt, 
financial and trade, through the placement of long-
term securities market with operational guarantees.  
The secondary market of debt securities is 
regarded as a reference and an active orientation 
for the expectations of economic performance and 
is one of the parameters of the climate for capital 
flows in relation to a debtor country.  
About the dynamics of this secondary market for 
securities, Assaf Neto (2008) says that in the 
globalized economy, negotiations with these titles 
are almost instant, linking the various financial 
markets. Among the various types of securities 
issued by Brazil in the renegotiation of external 
debt, the C-Bond is the best known and is highly 
liquid.  
Technical information is regularly issued by 
financial institutions that operate globally on the 
secondary market of debt bonds, to investors with 
regard to economic analyses as well as their 
expectations for the short and long term, including 
Brady Bonds in the calculations, where among the 
Brazilian securities traded, the C-Bonds are 
computed.  
Commenting on the analysis of the market about 
the debt rescheduling of external debt as a source 
reference to the associated risk of a country, 
Fortuna (2005) says that fulfillment can be 
associated with the price in which the C-Bond is 
being negotiated in the secondary market. Dooley, 
Fernándes-Arias and Kletzer (1996) show that the 
value of foreign debt securities in the secondary 
market is a useful barometer for a country’s 
credibility. 
On the expectations of investors with the analysis 
of secondary markets bonds, Fortuna (2005) states 
that in relation to Brazil, the C-Bonds are 
monitored according to the prices for which they 
are being negotiated.  
In this paper the assessment of sovereign risk is 
made by the secondary market analysis, using the 
information from the trade in assets of a country 
(Scholtens, 2004). More specifically, the Brazilian 
sovereign risk in this paper is evaluated as the 
spread of effective yields of Brazilian C-bonds in 
secondary markets over the effective yields of US 
Treasury securities, seen as “risk free” assets.  
Further in the paper the spread of effective yields 
of Brazilian C-bonds over the effective yields of US 
Treasury securities is called C-bond spread. The C-
bond, a highly liquid security emitted by the 
Federal Republic of Brazil in 1994 with maturity in 
2014, is part of the JP Morgan Emerging Market 
Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) and of the index EMBI+ 
Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil, 2005) and is used 
in other papers referring to the Brazilian sovereign 
risk, such as Loureiro and Barbosa (2004) and 
Moreira and Rocha (2003). 
Sovereign risk for emerging markets is normally 
rising in a currency and financial crisis, because 
the expectations of the actors on the international 
financial markets are changing negatively in a 
crisis, evaluating the probability of a default on the 
sovereign debt of the country, as rising.  
With rising probability of default for sovereign 
debt, on the secondary markets the supply of the 
securities is rising (the supply curve shifts to the 
right), while the demand is falling (the demand 
curve shifts to the left), with prices of the securities 
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also falling. With falling prices, the effective yield of 
the securities is rising, consequentially leading to 
rising spreads of the sovereign securities over US 
Treasuries (higher sovereign risk), while the prices 
and yields of US Treasuries are supposedly 
constant.  
The Graph 1 shows this behavior of the C-bond 
spread, the C-bond spread rising in the aftermath of 
the crisis of Mexico in 1995, in the Asian crisis in 
1997, in the Russian and Brazilian crises in 
1998/99, in the Argentine crisis in 2001, and in the 
most expressive rise during the Brazilian crisis in 
the election period 2002/03.  
Graph 1: C-bond spread over US treasuries 
Source: IPEADATA. 
As shown in Graph 1 in every financial crisis, the 
C-bond spread was significantly rising, showing 
contagion from crises in other countries and the 
loss of confidence of the international financial 
markets, and possibly anticipating the financial 
crisis. 
Also considered was the influence of financial 
crises on the C-bond spread and on the foreign 
portfolio investment flows to and from Brazil. Some 
might wonder if there are any leading indicators for 
pressure situations in the exchange markets leading 
to a financial crisis. A leading indicator has 
importance for the assessment and administration 
of risk in international transactions, especially for 
foreign portfolio investments and also for national 
macroeconomic policies in periods of crisis.  
3. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES 
SINCE THE REAL PLAN AND BRAZILIAN 
SOVEREIGN RISK 
The period since 1990 has been characterized by 
deep financial and economic international crises, 
especially in emerging markets, following the 
liberalization of capital markets and the capital 
account in the aftermath of the Washington 
Consensus.  
In Brazil the renegotiation of the external debt, 
the partial liberalization of capital markets and 
other markets, the opening of the country to the 
global markets, the privatization of public 
corporations, and the macroeconomic stabilization 
after the Real Plan led to expressive inflows of 
foreign capital in the period after the Real Plan 
success, however subject to high volatility in 
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periods of international crises, especially in the 
segment of foreign portfolio investment flows.  
Frenkel, Karman and Scholtens (2004) classify 
the types of financial crises according to IMF 
taxonomy: 
• Currency crisis: when there is a significant 
devaluation of a currency with loss of reserves 
and/or significant rise in interest rates in an 
attempt to defend the currency, caused by a 
speculative attack on the currency or a sudden 
unexpected event. 
• Banking crisis: when potential or actual bank 
failure or a bank run causes a major part of 
national banking system to suspend internal 
service of their liabilities, a situation which is 
typically accompanied by bank insolvencies. 
• Foreign debt for country crisis: when a country 
is not able or willing to service its foreign debt, 
whether public or private. Sovereign risk, as a 
special case, centering on the repayment 
perspectives of public debt. 
After the crisis of the European Monetary System 
in 1992/93, several financial and economic crises 
occurred in emerging countries and in 2007/08 a 
crisis occurred in the United States of America 
which is not included in the econometric modeling. 
Table 1 shows financial and exchange rate crises 
after 1994.  
Table 1: Financial and Exchange Rate Crises after 1994 
Year Origin Causes Effects 
1994 Mexico  Overvalued currency, credit bubble, 
political crisis, confidence crisis, 
speculative attacks on the national 
currency 
Devaluation, contagion to Latin 
America, banking crisis and deep 
recession  
1997 Southeast Asia Credit and investment bubble, hard peg 
to the US$, fragile banking regulation, 
confidence crisis, speculative attacks on 
the national currency 
Devaluation, contagion to the world, 
banking crisis and deep recession 
1998 Russia Unsustainable internal economic 
policies, fall in commodity prices, 
confidence crises and speculative 
attacks on the national currency 
Devaluation, contagion to Brazil, 
default on part of the external and 
internal debt, banking crisis and deep 
recession 
1998/99 Brazil Overvalued currency with crawling peg 
to the US$, high fiscal deficit and high 
deficit in the current account, rising 
public debt, confidence crises, capital 
flight and speculative attacks on the 
national currency 
Devaluation in January 1999 and 
change to a flexible exchange-rate 
system, economic problems in 
Argentina. 
2001 Argentina Hard peg to the US$, currency board, 
economic recession, also as a 
consequence of the devaluation of the 
real, high dollarization of debt, flight to 
the US$ 
Devaluation, default on external debt, 
deep recession, political and social 
problems 
2002/03 Brazil Confidence crisis in the election period, 
capital flight, rising public debt 
Depreciation of the real, credit crunch 
in the international financial markets 
for Brazil, restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies, rease in growth 
2007/08 United States of 
America 
Expansionary monetary policy 2001 to 
2004, bubble in the real estate sector 
and crack of the bubble beginning in 
2006, sub prime crises, securitizised 
debt sold to banks in other countries, 
bankruptcy of financial institutions, 
credit crunch and crisis of confidence, 
recession 
Fragility of the international financial 
system, banking crises in other 
countries, strong recession in the 
industrialized countries, credit crunch 
influences Brazil, fall of commodity 
prices 
Source: The authors. 
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The Mexican crisis in 1994/95 had negative 
influences in other South American countries. In 
1997 the financial crisis beginning in Thailand 
spread to Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea 
with contagion to other emerging countries.  
The Russian crisis with the partial default on part 
of the internal public debt, beginning in August of 
1998, reached Brazil in September leading to 
massive outflows of capital, expressive loss of 
international reserves, expressive rise in the short 
term interest rate SELIC, and a US$ 41.5 billion 
rescue packet from the IMF, the World Bank and 
the international financial community to stabilize 
the Brazilian economy and to defend the crawling 
peg of the R$ to the US$, with a yearly nominal 
devaluation of 7.5% between 1995 and January 
1999 (Aschinger, 2001, p. 106). In January 1999, 
after new speculative attacks, the Brazilian 
government and the Brazilian central bank floated 
the Real to avoid more losses of international 
reserves.  
In the aftermath of the crisis in Argentina in 2001 
with default on the external public debt in ember, in 
Brazil the second half of the year 2002 and the 
beginning of 2003 were characterized by an 
expressive depreciation of the Real and a massive 
rise in the spread of Brazilian C-bonds over US 
Treasuries, an often used measure of Brazilian 
sovereign risk.  
The turbulences on the exchange market were 
consequences of a crisis of confidence in the 
election process of 2002 and the uncertainty over 
the government policies of the new President Luiz 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva in 2003. With the new 
government pursuing stabilizing macroeconomic 
policies, the Real was appreciating again and the 
sovereign risk was expressively lining.  
The latest financial crisis began after the 
collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market and 
turned into a world wide financial collapse. This 
crisis showed that the great complexity of several 
modern financial products and instruments has 
become a weakness of the global financial system. 
But this crisis has not been included in the data for 
the econometric models 
4. INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRISES ON FINANCIAL AND 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
The financial crises since the Mexican crisis in 
1994 left impressive scars on the economies of the 
affected countries reflecting deep recessions with 
rising unemployment and poverty. In Indonesia and 
Argentina the gross domestic product lined more 
than ten percent in the aftermath of the crises. The 
main objective of the paper is to analyze the 
financial and macroeconomic variables, which 
could serve as leading indicators for financial 
crises in an early warning context for the 
assessment and administration of risk.  
As shown in Graph 1, the C-bond spread rises in 
all cases of a financial crisis in the period studied, 
rising to the highest point of 2335 basic points in 
the Brazilian crisis of 2002 during the election 
period, on the 27th of September of 2002. So, the 
sovereign risk measured by the C-bond spread 
should be a variable considered in the context of 
establishing relations and leading indicators for the 
occurrence of financial crises. 
In the literature, following Sy (2004), Kräussel 
(2004) and Frenkel and Fendel (2004), an exchange 
market pressure index (EMPI) or an index of 
speculative market pressure is used to identify 
currency crises. The variables, that in different 
combinations enter these indexes, are changes in 
the exchange rate, the short term interest rates, the 
international reserves and the stock market index. 
The Graph 2 shows the standardized variables, the 
IBOVESPA (the main stock market index of Brazil), 
the short term interest rate SELIC, the Brazilian 
international reserves and the exchange rate to the 
US$.  
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Graph 2: Standardized Variables of an Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) 
Source: Basic data: IPEADATA. 
All variables are highly volatile. All variables 
show expressive changes in the periods of 
international financial crises, with the exception of 
the exchange rate in the period of a crawling peg 
exchange rate system. In the crawling peg exchange 
rate system, prevailing between 1995 and January 
1999 in Brazil, the nominal exchange rate to the 
dollar was devaluating in a predicable manner but 
not sufficiently to prevent a revaluation of the Real 
exchange rate, because the residual inflation in 
Brazil after the successful Real Plan was still higher 
than the inflation rate in the United States and other 
commercial partners. The over valued exchange 
rate was one of the causes of the crisis in 1998/99.  
In the case of a crawling peg the central bank is 
confronting the outflows of capital in a crisis by 
sharply raising the short term interest rate and the 
central bank is obliged to sell international reserves 
to defend the crawling peg. In this exchange rate 
system the short term interest rate should be raised 
by the central bank, while the international reserves 
should fall. There was sharp rise in the short term 
interest rate SELIC and a sharp fall in international 
reserves in the 1998/99 crisis.  
After floating of the real, the exchange rate 
becomes more volatile, the exchange market 
pressure was directly accommodated by 
depreciations in the nominal exchange rate. In the 
dirty floating system after January 1999, the 
international reserves are less volatile and the short 
term interest rate is used with minor expression in 
attempts to reduce the depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate but the variables still show some 
volatility and reflexes in the crises of this period.  
The stock market also shows reactions to the 
financial crises, because in these crises the 
possibility of devaluations (crawling peg system) or, 
in the case of a floating exchange rate, the 
possibility of a sharp depreciation of the exchange 
rate leads to the possible capital losses. The 
possibility of capital losses leads to the selling of 
stocks and a drop in the stock market index 
(IBOVESPA), sometimes in anticipation of the 
crises.  
Financial crises with the chance of abandoning 
the crawling peg and a possible sharp devaluation, 
or, in the case of a floating exchange rate, the 
possibility of a sharp depreciation, lead to reactions 
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of foreign and national financial investors. In a 
crisis there should be a change in the direction of 
the flows and the possibility of liquid outflows. 
Obviously the movements of the C-bond spread 
on the secondary markets and foreign portfolio 
investment flows have no real connections, but there 
are connections through reactions on similar 
expectations in the international financial markets, 
especially in the case of international financial 
crises.  
The Graph 3 shows the flows of foreign portfolio 
investment in the period, for equity and fixed 
income. Especially the series of foreign portfolio 
investments in equity shows high volatility, and, 
among other factors, sharp changes in the flows, in 
the case of financial crises. The series of foreign 
portfolio investments in fixed income shows less 
volatility and expressive changes in flows only in 
the Asian crisis and the Brazilian crisis of 1998/99.  
Graph 3: Foreign Portfolio Investments in Equity and Fixed Income 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil. 
5. METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
In this paper the relation between the 
international financial crises and financial and 
macroeconomic variables was analyzed in the 
period from January 1995 to July 2005, 
emphasizing the variables: C-bond spread, stock 
market index IBOVESPA, short term interest rate 
SELIC, international reserves of Brazil, exchange 
rate R$/US$ and foreign portfolio capital flows in 
the segments of equity and fixed income. The 
monthly values of the variables were obtained from 
the Brazil’s Central Bank and IPEADATA.  
For the more refined analysis of the identification 
of a leading indicator for the financial crises, daily 
values are used from the same institutions; 
obviously the availability of daily variables is more 
restricted.  
In the discussion found in literature and in 
Scholtens (2004), there are other variables and 
ratios to assess the external vulnerability of a 
country influencing the possibility of a financial 
crisis, some of which were considered in the part on 
the econometric analysis of this paper. 
First, a qualitative econometric approach was 
made with dummy variables to analyze the influence 
of the international financial crises on the C-bond 
spread and the foreign portfolio investment flows in 
equity and fixed income, where the dummy 
variables reflect the periods of financial crises. 
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      (1) 
Where, 
t – Time index 
y – Dependent variable (C-bond spread, foreign 
portfolio investment flows) 
x – Mexican crisis 1994/95 (dummy) 
k – Asian crisis 1997 (dummy) 
u – Russian and Brazilian crises 1998/99 (dummy) 
w – Argentine crisis 2001 (dummy) 
z – Brazilian crisis election period 2002/03 
(dummy) 
βi – parameters 
e – stochastic error. 
For the levels of the C-bond spread, the 
coefficients of the dummies should be positive 
showing that the C-bond spread in times of crises is 
greater than the mean of the remainder of the 
period. For the first differences of the C-bond 
spread, the coefficients should be positive showing 
an increasing C-bond spread in times of crises. For 
the levels of the capital flows, the coefficient should 
be negative showing a lining level of the capital 
flows, it should also be more negative than the 
(positive) coefficient for the rest of the period (the 
intersection), because in times of crises the positive 
liquid inflow of capital should reverse to a negative 
liquid outflow of capital as a result of the crisis.  
Changing from a qualitative econometric 
analysis with binary variables as independent 
variables to a quantitative approach, it was 
necessary to consider directly variables, which 
express the financial stress for a country in the 
period of a financial crisis, to model the C-bond 
spread with econometric methods. In Sy (2004), 
Kräussel (2004) and Frenkel and Fendel (2004) the 
changes in the exchange rate, short term interest 
rates, international reserves and the stock market 
index are used as variables to construct an 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI) or an 
index of speculative market pressure to identify the 
financial and currency crises. The variables 
participate in different combinations for the 
construction of the index.  
In the ad hoc approach, an econometric model is 
defined with levels of the variables in the following 
form: C-bond spread as dependent variable, and the 
levels for the exchange rate R$/US$, the foreign 
portfolio investment flows in equity, the IBOVESPA 
stock market index, the international reserves of 
Brazil and the short term interest rate SELIC as 
independent variables, also including a constant: 
C-bond spread = β1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + 
β5X5 + β6X6 + ε 
(2) 
Where 
βi – parameters 
Xi – independent variables (as explained above) 
ε – stochastic error. 
Regression models with variables in levels with 
deterministic or stochastic trends can lead to 
erroneous interpretations. A first sign of possible 
problems is a very low Durbin-Watson in an 
otherwise significantly estimated model. 
Regressions in levels could result in spurious 
regressions, when the variables in the model are not 
stationary.  
To test the stationarity of the variables, the 
Dickey-Fuller test of (1979) is utilized. It tests the 
null hypothesis of a deterministic or stochastic 
trend in the data against the hypothesis of a 
stationary time series. If the Dickey-Fuller test for 
some variables does not show significant results, 
the regression results could be spurious. In this 
case a test of a model with first differences could be 
used to test the significance of the relations between 
the variables used in the model in levels. But, the 
model in first differences shows only the short term 
influences between the variables, excluding possible 
long term relations. Another possibility is to test for 
the possibility of co-integrating relations between 
the variables in levels.  
To simplify the model by constructing an 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI) to identify 
financial and currency crises in a quantitative 
manner, following Sy (2004), Kräussel (2004) and 
Frenkel and Fendel (2004), different indexes were 
constructed: 
∑
=
=
k
i
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Where, 
EMPIt    exchange market pressure index at period t 
wi   weight of variable i 
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Xi,t Value of the variable i included in the index 
at period t. 
The variables, which could be included, are 
changes in the exchange rate, short term interest 
rates, international reserves, the stock market index 
and the foreign portfolio investment flow in equity. 
With the exchange market pressure index (EMPI) 
and the foreign portfolio investment flow as 
independent variables and the first differences in 
the C-bond spread as dependent variable, a 
simplified model was constructed, which is 
equivalent to modeling the C-bond spread as a 
random walk with systematic influences of the 
EMPI and the foreign portfolio investment flows: 
(C-bond spreadt - C-bond spreadt-1) = β0 + 
β1EMPIt + β2(For. Inv. flows) + εt 
C-bond spreadt = β0 + C-bond spreadt-1 + 
β1EMPIt + β2(For. Inv. flows) + εt 
(3) 
To identify leading and lagging variables, which 
is obviously important for the assessment of early 
warning variables in an international crisis and 
equally important for the administration of risk in 
international transactions, the Granger causality 
test (Granger, 1969) is used to identify the 
precedence (Granger Causality) of one variable to 
another. The Granger causality test is used for 
monthly data and also for available daily data of 
the variables in discussion, because the analysis of 
daily data is more important for understanding the 
rapid propagation of international financial and 
currency crises.  
6. ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC 
MODELS 
6.1. Influence of international crises on the C-
bond spread and foreign portfolio 
investment flows 
The basic hypothesis is that the international 
financial and currency crises have impacts on the 
C-bond spreads and the foreign portfolio investment 
flows through the negative changes in the 
expectations of the actors in the international 
financial markets.  
In an international crisis the C-bond spread is 
rising, while the foreign portfolio investment flows 
are reasing with the possibility of liquid outflows of 
foreign capital. In the econometric models the 
dependent variable is the C-bond spread (or 
alternatively, changes in the C-bond spread) and 
the independent variables are dummies 
characterizing the international financial crises. 
The estimated econometric models are for the 
dependent variables of foreign portfolio investments 
in equity and fixed income (levels only). 
The dummies of the financial crises assume a 
value of 1 in the period of the crisis and a value of 0 
otherwise. The Mexican crisis (DUMMEX 1995:1 – 
1995:4), the Asian crisis (DUMASIA 1997:9-
1998:1), The Russian crisis and the Brazilian crisis 
(DUMRBR 1998:9-1999:2), the crisis in Argentina 
(DUMARG 2001:7 – 2001:12), the Brazilian crisis 
in the election period (DUMEL 2002:6 – 2003:1). 
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.  
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Table 2: C-BOND SPREAD and international financial and currency crises 
Dependent Variable: C-BOND SPREAD Dependent Variable:  
First differences C-BOND SPREAD 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:01 2005:06 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
DUMMEX 468.9279 4.568672 0.0000 DUMMEX 86.59389 1.399341 0.1643 
DUMASIA -181.6505 -1.969144 0.0512 DUMASIA 57.26605 1.182926 0.2392 
DUMRBR 412.2063 4.871561 0.0000 DUMRBR 56.85546 1.280279 0.2029 
DUMARG 327.6833 3.192554 0.0018 DUMARG 25.92954 0.583885 0.5604 
DUMEL 943.3664 12.75282 0.0000 DUMEL 73.06485 1.881631 0.0623 
C 718.1355 35.50414 0.0000 C -18.31842 -1.709085 0.0900 
R-squared 0.633815 Mean d. v. 815.7415 R-squared 0.059467 Mean d. v. -5.299699 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.618558 S.D d. var.  325.8597 Adjusted R-
squared 
0.019949 S.D. d. var 106.6316 
Durbin-
Watson stat 
0.556927 Prob  
(F-statistic) 
0.000000 Durbin-
Watson stat 
1.302266 
 
Prob  
(F-statistic) 
0.193427 
Source: : Basic Data: IPEADATA. 
The coefficients of the binary variables for the 
financial crises show the differences of the C-bond 
spread in times of crises compared to the mean of 
the rest of the period (718 basic points). A positive 
sign means that the level of the C-bond spread in 
the times of crises is above the mean level.  
All variables show a significantly positive level 
above the mean, with the exception of the coefficient 
of the Asian crisis, which shows a negative sign, 
because the level of the C-bond spread before the 
crisis was very low. But the second part of the table 
shows that even in the Asian crises, the C-bond 
spread was rising (positive sign), as is the case for 
all other crises. 
The second column shows positive changes of the 
C-bond spread in the periods of all financial crises, 
including the Asian crisis. This corroborates the 
hypothesis that the C-bond spread rises in periods 
of financial crises, with levels of the spread well 
above the level in normal times (with exception of 
the Asian crisis).  
The results of Table 3 corroborate the hypothesis 
that the foreign portfolio investment flows are 
reasing in periods of financial crises, showing 
liquid outflows in the segment of equity and fixed 
income in all crises with exception of the crisis in 
Argentina of 2001, the mean level of the foreign 
portfolio investments equity is reasing, but still 
showing inflows (424 less 326).  
The reasing inflows, but not liquid outflows, in 
the Argentine crisis show, that the Argentine crisis 
did not have a strong contagion in relation to the 
Brazilian economy. That is true in the Argentine 
crisis also for other variables, because the Brazilian 
economy in 2001 was more negatively influenced by 
the energy crisis in that year than by the Argentine 
crisis.  
Table 3: Foreign portfolio investment flows and international financial crises 
Dependent Variable:  
Foreign portfolio investment equity 
Dependent Variable:  
Foreign portfolio investment fixed income 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:01 2005:06 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
DUMMEX -1029.228 -3.408370 0.0009 DUMMEX -797.7813 -1.049156 0.2962 
DUMASIA -607.2040 -2.237100 0.0271 DUMASIA -1008.313 -1.475255 0.1428 
DUMRBR -980.6407 -3.938517 0.0001 DUMRBR -1696.832 -2.706343 0.0078 
DUMARG -326.7434 -1.312289 0.1919 DUMARG -915.1153 -1.459553 0.1470 
DUMEL -451.2631 -2.072745 0.0403 DUMEL -1450.895 -2.646508 0.0092 
C 424.8770 7.070158 0.0000 C 614.3973 4.060096 0.0001 
R-squared 0.212934 Mean d. v. 277.1997 R-squared 0.121201 Mean d. v. 332.5597 
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Adjusted R-
squared 
0.180139 S.D d. var.  653.6571 Adjusted R-
squared 
0.084584 S.D. d. var 1557.721 
Durbin-
Watson stat 
1.493540 
 
Prob  
(F-statistic) 
0.000022 Durbin-
Watson stat 
1.426588 
 
Prob  
(F-statistic) 
0.007772 
Source: Basic Data: Banco Central do Brasil. 
The variables representing the exchange market 
pressure, the exchange rate R$/US$, the IBOVESPA 
stock market index, the international reserves of 
Brazil and the short term interest rate SELIC also 
show significant changes in periods of international 
financial crises, corroborating the hypotheses 
mentioned above (the exchange rate, obviously, is 
rising significantly only in the periods of crises  
after the floating of the Real in January 1999; while 
the international reserves are falling, with the 
exception of the Asian crisis, and the SELIC rate 
shows no significant change in the crisis of 
Argentina and the Brazilian crisis of 2002/03, 
corroborating the theoretical insight that in a 
floating exchange rate system, monetary policy is 
more independent).  
6.2. Model relating the levels of the relevant 
macroeconomic variables 
To explain the dependent variable, C-bond 
spread, by the main macroeconomic variables, the 
exchange rate R$/US$ (EXRATE), the foreign 
portfolio investment flows equity (EQUITY), the 
IBOVESPA stock market index (IBOVESPA), the 
international reserves of Brazil (RESERVES) and 
the short term interest rate (SELIC), an ad hoc 
econometric model is estimated to assess the 
compatibility of the results with macroeconomic 
theory. The results are shown in Table 4. 
The regression shows an expressive adjustment 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.81. The coefficients are 
significant on the level of significance of at least 
0.05 and show the theoretically expected signs.  
The sign of the exchange rate is positive, showing 
a positive relation of the exchange rate with the C-
bond spread. In periods of financial crises the 
exchange rate and the C-bond spread are rising (at 
least theoretically in a floating exchange rate 
system).  
The sign of the foreign portfolio investment flow 
equity is negative, showing a negative relation of 
the foreign investment flow with the C-bond spread. 
In periods of financial crises, theoretically, the 
foreign investment flows should fall, while the C-
bond spread rises, a negative correlation. 
The sign of the Brazilian stock market index 
IBOVESPA is negative, showing a negative relation 
between the IBOVESPA and the C-bond spread. In 
periods of financial crises the stock market index 
should fall (expectations of capital losses), while the 
C-bond spread should rise.  
Table 4: Model explaining levels of the C-bond spread 
Dependent Variable: C-BOND SPREAD 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:01 2005:07 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EXRATE 294.5300 22.45377 13.11717 0.0000 
EQUITY -0.058062 0.020097 -2.889108 0.0046 
IBOVESPA -0.045785 0.003165 -14.46602 0.0000 
RESERVES -0.007975 0.001275 -6.253143 0.0000 
SELIC 56.78967 23.87480 2.378645 0.0189 
C 1104.330 109.3137 10.10239 0.0000 
R-squared 0.819547     Mean dependent var 812.0829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.812091     S.D. dependent var 327.1723 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.365394     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Source: Basic Data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
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The sign of the international reserves is negative, 
showing a negative relation between the 
international reserves and the C-bond spread. In 
periods of financial crises the central bank has to 
defend the crawling peg (in a crawling peg 
exchange rate system) or tends to contain the rising 
of the exchange rate (in a dirty floating exchange 
rate system) by selling dollars (reasing the 
international reserves), while the C-bond spread is 
rising. 
The sign of the short term interest rate SELIC is 
positive, showing a positive relation between the 
SELIC and the C-bond spread. In periods of 
financial crises the central bank tends to contain the 
outflow of capital by raising the short term interest 
rate, to contain the outflow of capital and make 
speculative attacks more costly for the speculators, 
while the C-bond spread is rising.  
The estimated regression equation therefore 
seems reasonable, but there is a serious 
shortcoming, an extremely low Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 0.365. The Durbin-Watson statistic for 
testing first order autocorrelation of the residuals is 
seen, in contemporary econometric methodology, as 
a signal for a possible spurious regression, 
resulting from a regressing non-stationary time 
series or as a signal of a misspecification of the 
model.  
The stationarity of the time series can be tested 
by the augmented Dickey-Fuller test ADF (1979). 
The results for the levels of the time series and the 
first differences are given in Table 5.  
Table 5: ADF (Dickey-Fuller) test statistic (lag = 4) significant, at least at the 0.1 level 
Variable Included Level  First Differences  
C-bond spread Trend and intercept -2.819134 no -5.118529 0.01 
Foreign Inv. equity Intercept -5.021766 0.01 -6.798909 0.01 
Exchange rate R$/US$ Trend and intercept -2.183353 no -4.103469 0.01 
IBOVESPA Trend and intercept -1.945208 no -5.463611 0.01 
Reserves Trend and intercept -2.750218 no -5.360997 0.01 
SELIC Trend and intercept -3.807792 0.05 -5.355575 0.01 
Source: Basic Data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
Table 5 shows all the variables are not stationary 
in levels, with exception of the variable foreign 
portfolio investment flow equity and of the variable 
short term interest rate SELIC, while all the 
variables in first differences are stationary. So the 
results of the model in Table 3 with the variables in 
levels could be spurious.  
But an estimation of the same model in first 
differences representing the short term changes of 
the variables shows significant results for the 
parameters of the model (with exception of the 
international reserves) with signs corroborated by 
theory, with exception of the variable of the short 
term interest rate SELIC. So there could be a co-
integration between some variables in levels and an 
error correction model could be constructed, but 
this is not explored in this paper. 
6.3. Model including an exchange market 
pressure index (EMPI) as independent 
variable 
But the explanation in this paper simplifies the 
explaining variables in the model by introducing an 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI) to measure 
financial and currency crises  in a quantitative 
manner, following Sy (2004), Kräussel (2004) and 
Frenkel and Fendel (2004),  
∑
=
=
k
i
tiit XwEMPI
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,
 
Where, 
EMPIt  exchange market pressure index at 
period t 
wi  weight of variable i 
Xi,t  Value of the variable i included in 
the index at period t. 
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Different specifications of the exchange market 
pressure index (EMPI) were tested introducing in 
the model, changes (standardized) in the exchange 
rate, short term interest rates, international 
reserves and the stock market index, with equal 
weights, with the exception of the exchange rate 
which was a double weight because of the 
importance of the exchange rate in an index which 
shows the exchange market pressure. The Graph 4 
shows the EMPI and the changes (standardized) of 
the C-bond spread.  
Graph 4: C-bond spread change and Exchange market pressure index 
Sources: Basic data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
The EMPI and the changes of the C-bond spread 
(standardized) show positive correlation, the EMPI 
underestimating the changes in the Brazilian crisis 
of the election period, probably because of the 
strong political character of the crisis. 
The model in first differences of the C-bond 
spread is shown here equivalently as a random walk 
model with systematic influence of the independent 
variables EMPI and foreign portfolio investment 
flow equity (equation 3), with results shown in 
Table 6.  
The model shows an expressive adjustment (R2 
adjusted = 0.946), the coefficients have the signs 
corroborated by theory and, with exception of the 
constant, are significant on the level of significance 
0.01. But the Durbin-Watson is relatively small, 
showing first order autocorrelation or a possible 
misspecification of the model, but in the case of a 
lagged dependent variable between the independent 
variables, the Durbin-Watson test is no longer 
appropriate.  
The sign of the exchange market pressure index 
is positive, showing a positive relation of the 
exchange market pressure index with the C-bond 
spread. In periods of financial crises the exchange 
market pressure index and the C-bond spread are 
rising.  
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Table 6: Model random walk C-bond spread 
Dependent Variable: CBONDSPREAD 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:02 2005:07 
CBONDSPREAD=C(1)+ CBONDSPREAD(-1) + C(2)*EMPI+C(3)*Foreign Investment flow equity 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 4.181016 7.658697 0.545917 0.5861 
C(2) 102.6009 12.58035 8.155646 0.0000 
C(3) -0.032312 0.011895 -2.716438 0.0075 
R-squared 0.946798     Mean dependent var 810.3072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.945933     S.D. dependent var 327.8634 
Log likelihood -723.3309     Durbin-Watson stat 1.265917 
The lagged dependent variable C-bond spread (-1) doesn’t appear among the independent variables because its 
coefficient is a priori equal to 1 (random walk) 
Source: Basic Data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
The sign of the foreign portfolio investment flow 
equity is negative, showing a negative relation of 
the foreign investment flow with the C-bond spread. 
In periods of financial crises theoretically the 
foreign investment flow should fall, while the C-
bond spread rises, a negative correlation. 
Graph 5 shows the forecasts with the model in 
Table 5, showing that the dynamic forecast (using 
for the lagged dependent variable, values 
calculated (forecasted) by the model, while the 
static forecast uses the actual values of the 
dependent variable) seriously underestimating the 
rise in the C-bond spread in the Russian and 
Brazilian crises in 1998/99 and in the Brazilian 
crisis of the election period in 2002/03.  
Graph 5: C-bond spread actual values, dynamic and static forecasts 
Sources: Basic Data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
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To identify leading lag relations between the 
monthly variables analyzed, the Granger causality 
test is used; the results are shown in Table 7. 
On a significance level of 0.05 the C-bond spread 
precedes (Granger causality) the variables EMPI 
and foreign portfolio investment flow equity, it 
could be a leading indicator for an international 
financial crisis.  
Table 7: Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1995:01 2005:12 
Lags: 4 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
EMPI does not Granger Cause CBONDSPREAD 122  1.65001  0.16664 
CBONDSPREAD does not Granger Cause EMPI  5.47533  0.00046 
EQUITY does not Granger Cause CBONDSPREAD 123  1.70789  0.15307 
CBONDSPREAD does not Granger Cause EQUITY  2.55115  0.04289 
EQUITY does not Granger Cause EMPI 122  1.62330  0.17324 
EMPI does not Granger Cause EQUITY  2.19642  0.07384 
EQUITY Foreign portfolio investment flows 
Source: Own calculations. 
So the above models could be reformulated with 
the C-bond spread as one independent variable to 
explain changes in the other variables. But to 
establish lead lag structures between the variables, 
the available daily data must be analyzed, as shown 
in the next paragraph, because the propagation of 
international crises is in days, not in months. 
7. ANALYSIS OF DAILY DATA 
Daily data were available for the variables, the 
C-bond spread, the exchange rate R$/US$, the stock 
market index IBOVESPA and the short term interest 
rate SELIC. As Table 8 shows there are 
correlations with the expected signs between the 
variables.  
Table 8: Correlations of the daily variables 
 CBONDSPREAD EXCHANGERATE IBOVESPA SELIC 
CBONDSPREAD  1.000000  0.244098 -0.482310  0.272119 
EXCHANGERATEE  0.244098  1.000000  0.623000 -0.539253 
IBOVESPA -0.482310  0.623000  1.000000 -0.658011 
SELIC  0.272119 -0.539253 -0.658011  1.000000 
Source: Basic data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
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The Graph 6 shows that in the periods of crises, 
the daily variables also develop as expected and 
described above, for the monthly variables. 
 
Graph 6: C-bond spread, exchange rate, SELIC, IBOVESPA, daily standardized values 
Source: Basic Data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
While the variables describing signals of the 
markets for the exchange market pressure (C-bond 
spread for the secondary external debt market, 
IBOVESPA for the Brazilian stock market and the 
exchange rate for the exchange market) seem to be 
changing simultaneously, there seems to be a slight 
lag in the short term interest rate SELIC. There 
seems to be a slight lag of the monetary policy 
variable in relation to the market signal variables, 
because the monetary policy is reacting with a 
certain lag to changes in the variables showing the 
market signals. The Granger causality test in Table 
9 shows the same results. 
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Table 9: Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1/02/1995 7/29/2005 
Lags: 3 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  EXCHANGERATES does not Granger Cause 
CBONDSPREADS 
2582  0.95700  0.41211 
  CBONDSPREADS does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATES 
 66.1572  0.00000 
  IBOVESPAS does not Granger Cause 
CBONDSPREADS 
2582  7.57923  4.8E-05 
  CBONDSPREADS does not Granger Cause 
IBOVESPAS 
 2.13230  0.09409 
  SELIC does not Granger Cause 
CBONDSPREADS 
2582  1.21251  0.30359 
  CBONDSPREADS does not Granger Cause SELIC  9.27252  4.3E-06 
  IBOVESPAS does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATES 
2582  24.7761  8.4E-16 
  EXCHANGERATES does not Granger Cause 
IBOVESPAS 
 1.19112  0.31160 
  SELIC does not Granger Cause 
EXCHANGERATES 
2582  0.74561  0.52483 
  EXCHANGERATES does not Granger Cause SELIC  0.57547  0.63113 
  SELIC does not Granger Cause IBOVESPAS 2582  1.24938  0.29021 
  IBOVESPAS does not Granger Cause SELIC  5.25507  0.00129 
Source: Basic data: IPEADATA, Banco Central do Brasil. 
While the market variables (with exception of the 
exchange rate, probably caused by the inclusion of 
the period of a crawling peg, because the Granger 
causality test shows simultaneity for the period of a 
floating exchange rate also for the exchange rate) 
are determined simultaneously, the SELIC rate does 
not Granger cause the market variables, while these 
do Granger cause the SELIC rate. So the market 
variables precede the SELIC rate, while this reacts 
with a certain short lag.  
8. CONCLUSIONS  
The paper analyzed the Brazilian sovereign risk, 
measured by the C-bond spread over US treasuries, 
and related variables, like the exchange rate 
R$/US$, the international reserves of Brazil, the 
short term interest rate SELIC, the Brazilian stock 
market index IBOVESPA and the foreign portfolio 
investment flow equity, and their behavior 
influenced by international financial and currency 
crises. An econometric analysis showed that all 
these variables are strongly influenced by the 
international financial crises after 1995.  
The deregulation of its capital market (allowing 
greater flexibility and mobility to foreign capital), 
the process of economic stabilization triggered by 
the Real Plan and the stabilization of domestic 
prices, as well as increasing credibility of the 
Brazilian economy in the external market over the 
ade, all influences that were demonstrated by the 
recent sovereign rating classification published by 
the most important credit rating agencies. 
Another important factor for the Brazilian 
economy was the conclusion of negotiations for the 
conversion of its foreign debt in 1994, initiated by 
the signing of Brazil Bond Exchange Agreement on 
September 22nd, 1988. The important role of 
domestic price stabilization observed after 
implementation of the Real Plan in June 1994 
should also be mentioned. Two major factors are 
pointed out as responsible for the improvement of 
Brazilian’s sovereign ratings, changes in its 
macroeconomic environment and legal treatment of 
international capital. 
Direct investments and portfolio investments 
have been the important factors in the flow of 
investment to Brazil and have been some important 
determinants for increasing development.  
The entry of private capital that does not generate 
debt flows within the various Brazilian companies, 
has helped in the process of technological 
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renovation and contributed to the implementation of 
policies for adjustment.  
Within the amount of direct investments, changes 
in the internal scenario of the Brazilian economy, 
particularly after the process of economic 
stabilization triggered by the Real Plan in 1994, 
stimulated both the transfer of funds outside the 
headquarters of many multinational companies as 
well as the repatriation of capital belonging to 
Brazilians who were abroad.  
Direct investments were also responsible for other 
benefits such as the adoption of new technologies 
that have been very useful in the process of renewal 
and modernization of various aspects of Brazilian 
economic infrastructure. The repatriation of capital 
to the Brazilian economy has also been significant.  
The results pointed out in this paper suggest that 
the credibility of a country with respect to the 
international investors plays an important role in 
the ision about the definition of portfolios. 
Significant influences over the C-bond spread 
were found (both positive and negative). Real/US 
Dollar exchange rate and short term interest rate 
SELIC showed positive relations with C-Bond 
spreads. On the other hand, international reserves 
of Brazil, the stock market index IBOVESPA and 
the foreign portfolio investment flow equity had 
negative relations, as corroborated by economic 
theory. 
To identify the international financial crises and 
their influences on the C-bond spread by an 
exchange market pressure index, according to the 
literature, an index was constructed, and an 
econometric model was formulated which showed 
significant influences of the exchange market 
pressure index (EMPI) and the foreign portfolio 
investment flow equity on the C-bond spread, 
presuming a random walk model for the C-bond 
spread. 
Dynamic forecasts by the model show an 
expressive sub-estimation of the C-bond spread 
level in the Brazilian crises of 1998/99 and 
2002/03, making another specification of the model 
necessary in future research, for example, using 
Markov-Switching models.  
On a monthly basis it seems that the C-bond 
spread is a leading variable, but in the light of the 
rapid propagation of the international financial 
crises, an analysis of daily data was necessary. The 
analysis of the daily variables showed that the 
market variables (C-bond spread for the secondary 
external debt market, IBOVESPA for the Brazilian 
stock market and the exchange rate for the 
exchange market) are determined simultaneously 
(the exchange rate only in the period of a floating 
exchange rate), while the SELIC rate reacts with a 
certain short lag. This is corroborated by the theory 
that monetary policy reacts to the financial crises 
more than it anticipates them. 
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